The Legendary B-24 "Liberator": Jokingly known by many as the "Packing box the B-17 came in", the first Liberators (the British name for the aircraft) to see service were 6 LB-30A's (the LB suffix standing for Land Bomber) but due to its lack of frontline suitability (no self-sealing fuel tanks) they were diverted to Ferry Command which later formed into Transport Command in 1943. The first "fully operational" Liberators, were 20 LB-30B's which were built for the USAAC but were diverted to the UK and first saw action with the RAF as the "Mk I" serial numbers AM910 - AM929. Number 120 Sqn Coastal Command began operations with the Mk.I's in Sept of 1941, from RAF Nutts Corner. 120 would go on to become Coastal's most successful squadron in the U-boat war, resultant from the combination of their extended time spent on suitable aircraft in high enemy contact areas with U-boats and their highly successful levels of training with a keen eye for accurate bomb drops. In the early days flying the Mk.I's the bombardier was required to drop the DC's by eye, with no aid of a bombsight (Peter Clare).

The Consolidated B-24 Liberator is probably one of the best known American bombers of all time despite the fact that its role during WWII is vastly overshadowed by the "much prettier" B-17 Flying Fortress (according to some). The Liberator was the most produced American aircraft during the war and at its peak of production a new B-24 bomber was being made every 51 minutes. A total of 19,256 Liberator aircraft and variants were manufactured between 1940 and 1945. The B-24J Liberator circa 1944 was the most produced model with 6,678 built. The first B-24D (MkIII RAF) rolled of the production line on 22 January 1942 (which is the aircraft that 59 Squadron received in late 1942) and in total there were 2,696 B-24D's made. This was also the first model Liberator to have exhaust driven turbo-superchargers. The B-24H was the first production Liberator to roll of the line with a nose turret already installed (previously they were fitted out once in the UK). The Liberator was a rugged aircraft that regularly brought crews home despite extensive damage, so it was often assigned the toughest and longest missions. It is the only aircraft to have served in every theatre of the war, it was faster than the B-17, had a longer range and could carry a higher payload. On the downside, the Lib was said by some to be harder to manoeuvre and control (due to the wing type) and was thus unsuitable for formation flying and the Mk.I's turbo-charged Pratt & Whitney engines left a flame trail, making it unsuitable for night missions (Endurance, 1996). Further more, any damage to the specialised Davis Wing was a serious problem for Liberator aircraft and crews, and some sources will argue that the B-17 Flying Fortress could hands down take far more damage than the Liberator and continue operating. Indeed there seems to be a lot more pictures of severely damaged B-17's that have made it home (especially of those missing the nose section of the aircraft), than pictures of B-24's with similar damage.

(left) "...Liberator Mk III S/59 (S for Sugar) took off from St Eval in Cornwall. It was 05.28 and on board were seven men _ F/O HAL Moran, P/O PD Weight-Vowden, P/O RD Stevenson and Sergeants L Hadfield, L Stalker, I B Jenkins and K R Regan..." Mk.III FL 933 - S/59, was later replaced by FL984 Mk.V as S/59.

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LV337 E/120 - A Mk.IIIA Liberator aircraft awaits as the sun breaks through.

59 Sqn B-24 Liberator RAF GR.Mk IIIA-VIII: on 17th August 1942, 59 Sqn ceased operations to convert from the Hudson to the Liberator RAF GR.Mk III (with at least one IIIA, LV342 - V/59 which was in fact the squadrons first Lib) and they began training to join the U-boat war. Apart from a few months in early 1943 in which they were operational with the B-17 Flying Fortress (RAF I-II-IIA), they would fly the Liberator for the rest of the war. The first of the two images below (of a crew training on the Liberator), show the squadron code still with the prefix 'TR'. It would seem that once they became operational, the Squadron code became "1" (later becoming 'WE' and 'BY') accompanied by a single aircraft identification code letter. W/C Bartlett flew the first flight on the 21st of Aug. when he and his crew flew LV342 V/59 (ex A/120) from Ballykelly to North Coates. According to an account of the flight by W/C Bartlett in Endurance (Alwyn Jay), this was the first time that a four engine aircraft had been deliberately landed there. LV342 was flown to Thorney Island by S/L Dunkerley and crew on the 29th of August, from Waltham. By the 2nd of Sept the whole Squadron had relocated to RAF Thorney Island were they began training. According to AIR27-561 - It appears that at this time - 59 Sqn had on its strength two Liberator aircraft, however the second is unknown at this stage. On moving to Thorney Island, they still had 3 or 4 of the Hudson aircraft.

On the above mentioned flight of LV342 from Waltham to Thorney Island, the squadron code is noted as "A" in the navigators log book (F/L Longmuir), perhaps this was a hang up from it's service with 120 Sqn as "A/120" and the code letter was yet to be changed on the fuselage. Liberator LV342 was part of a batch of 10 B-24D RAF MkIII's delivered to the UK that had been equipped with Mk.V ASV (Air to Surface Vessel) radar and then re-coded B-24D Mk.IIIA in June 1942. Prior to this, No. 120 Sqn had successfully tested the Mk.V radar for use in Coastal Command operations. The typical early model Mk.III aircraft was equipped with only Mk.II ASV (E Allen notes in his memoirs that initially the 59 Sqn Mk.III's had no radar) and the ORB for this period notes with all sorties flown "No. S.E Fitted"... but with the implementation of Metox (an ASV radar detection device) by the U-boat fleet in Sept of 1942, even those with Mk.II A.S.V soon saw it become virtually obsolete and in need of replacement... The answer existed in the Mk.III radar but Bomber Command had of course assumed priority over the already existing radar sets, initially releasing only 30 for use in the U-boat war. Often you will find that some sources will note the radar type used as Mk.III ASV and others as Mk.V ASV. They were in fact basically one in the same, only Mk.V was an American built version of the British Mk.III and was developed to speed up the delivery of suitable radar technology to Coastal Command aircraft.

In order to speed up the delivery of the aircraft to Coastal Command squadrons the Mk.IIIA's kept their USAAF armaments but by late 1942, they had been modified to fit standard GR.Mk.III armament (for operations in the Atlantic or Bay of Biscay etc). The typical early model Mk.III aircraft was equipped with only Mk.II ASV but with the implementation of Metox (an ASV radar detection device) by the U-boat fleet in Sept of 1942, Mk.II ASV soon became virtually obsolete and in need of replacement... The answer existed hence the urgent need by Coastal for the new centemetric Mk.III or Mk.V radar...

Training: The Month of Sept. '42 was spent training with no operations carried out. Throughout the month, the pilots attended courses at No. 1509 BAT Flight (Beam Approach Training - also known as Blind Approach).

"Beam approach (sometimes written as blind approach) was essential training for bomber pilots who would have to return to their Bases in the dark in often less than ideal conditions, where visibility could be marginal. Put simply, the beam approach system relied on two audible signals, Morse A (dit dah) and N (dah dit) which originated from differing parts of the airfield, which was "divided" into four quadrants. Listening to the signals, the pilot knew which side of the airfield he was flying in from. When he started hearing both signals of different strengths, he was aware of how close to the centre line he was. When both signals merged and became a continuous sound, he knew he was "on the beam". Ancillary signals enabled the pilot to land in very poor conditions." www.galgos.co.uk

 

Liberator Mk.III Operations Begin: On the 24th of Oct 1942 (after nearly two months training) four crews were detached to RAF St. Eval to begin operations (whilst the rest of the Squadron continued to train). This sortie was undertaken by P/O H.A.L Moran & crew in Lib. MK.III - FL933 - S/59. From St. Eval the detachment flew anti-submarine sweeps and convoy escorts over the Bay of Biscay and as more crews reached operational standard, they too began to operate out of St. Eval. This continued until the 11th of Dec 1942 when the last Liberator mission of the year was flown by F/O A.R. Neilson & crew.

In the Op's room - St.Eval - November 1942

F/O Barson looks over the maps. His navigator is F/O Longmuir (bottom right)

A crew get briefed by Intelligence Officer Shackleton before take off (F/O Longmuir - far left)

Top Secret Testing: For the first 3 weeks of Dec. 1942 and into the conversion period to the Fortress (see below), 59 Squadron crews were assigned by HQ. Coastal Command, the task of testing a new bombsight. F/L Allen recalls that these tests were "very hush-hush"... Wikipedia states the following...

"Following the production of the 600 lb depth bomb, a Mark III angular-velocity, low-level bombsight was developed. At the eighth meeting of the Anti-Submarine Committee, chaired by de la Ferté, on 16 December 1942 at H.Q. Coastal Command, they examined ORU reports of the results with the device. No. 59 Squadron RAF had been given the task of testing the sight and were operating the Liberator MkIII during the period that the results were gathered. AOC Wing Commander G.C.C Bartlett AFC & P/O H.R. Longmuir (Bomber Leader) presented the following report to the committee:

Thirty-four bombs were dropped by three aimers (P/O H.R. Longmuir, F/O G.W. LaForme & F/O F.W.W. Cole) at a stationary target, and later on a target towed at 8 knots [9.2mph]. For [a total of] forty-two bombs the average range error was 18yd [yards].[22]

However it was considered the low-level sight's chief advantages would be demonstrated under operational conditions. The sight was considered a great advancement on any previous method of low-level bombing, either by eye or with a bombsight. The best figures from No. 59 Squadron's trials were 6 yd range error with release from 800 ft, and 5 yd error when approaching at 100 ft, but releasing from 400 ft with the aircraft's nose slightly up.[22] Some academics in the ORS stated a 20 yd error range existed but maintained the Mark III was promising. Some crews did not trust the device, which was the case when asked to use equipment of which they had little experience. Instead, many continued relying on their own trusted eyesight. A continued lack of resources meant there was no widespread use of the sights. In later months, the aircrew changed tactics and with new weapons, they decided that it would take too long to zero-in on a target using the device. Pilots and crew often opted to use their own judgement by direct sighting with considerable success.[source]

On the 13th, the squadron began conversion to the B17 Flying Fortress... In March 1943, they would revert back to the Liberator but with an upgraded variant, the Mk.V VLR (Very Long Range).

(above) Mk.III FL923 flys low over terrain. This aircraft was delivered to 120 Sqn then flew with 59. After leaving 59 it alternated between 224 and 120, ending service with the latter when shot down by flak guns aboard U-537 on 10/04/1943.

Liberator Operations Interupted: In the book "Boeing B-17 Fortress - in RAF Coastal Command", Robert Stitt states the following...

"The Air Ministry recognised that promised deliveries of Liberators and Fortresses would not be met and in August 1942 revised its New Expansion Plan... It was now hoped that three Liberator squadrons would be formed (on Coastal Command) but this failed to happen due to allocation of aircraft elswhere by American authoirities... To address this critical shortage, the Air Ministry contracted Scottish Aviation in November 1942 to modify all 33 Liberator IIIA's to Long Range configuration... a program that would take three months to complete..."

This predicament stretched the resources of 120 Sqn very thin, so 59's Lib's were reallocated to 120, to bolster their ranks... So from Dec. 13th 1942 till end of March 1943, 59 Sqn operated the B-17 Fortress. According to Robert, the original plan had been to re-equip 59 with new Halifaxes but enough Fortresses had become available to equip three squadrons. 59 were the third to operate the Fortress... 59 Sqn's C/O, W/C Bartlett A.F.C was not happy at all with the situation, having trained up on the Liberator Mk.III's only to have them realloacted very soon after and being forced back into training again on a new aircraft, this would have been very frustrating. He was visited by Air Chief Marshal Ludlow-Hewitt, who later wrote to Air Marshal Slessor stating...

"Ulimately of course, we shall have to re-equip one of the Fortress squadrons to Liberators again, it is all a little bit of a mess..."

59 were that squadron and once the task of re-configuring the Liberator Mk.III's to full VLR status was completed, they were back to operations on the Mk.V... READ MORE ABOUT THE FORTRESS OP'S

Conversion to the Liberator Mk.V - VLR: In late Feb. 1943, whilst 59 were still flying the Fortress IIA's, their Lib Mk.III's were converted to Mk.V's and full VLR status, with the addition of Mk.III ASV radar (59 being the last of the frontline U-boat hunting squadrons to be fully equipped as such) and the removal/addition of armament as per required. On the 27th of March 1943, the Squadron relocated form RAF Chivenor to RAF Thorney Island and by early April 1943, 59 Squadron had reverted back to their newer look Liberators, now GR.Mk V's. The month of April was spent training on the new Mark.V and on May 7th, they went operational from St. Eval, on detachment.

A Disastrous Start on the Mk.V: On May the 7th, the first operational sortie was undertaken in the new Mk.V Liberators. Four crews were sent out on a convoy escort. According to F/L Allen, they were told that they were to escort the Queen Mary and he vaguely remembers them being told that Churchill was onboard. The weather on this day was terrible with strong gale force conditions. Of the four aircraft sent out, all were recalled before the convoy could be met. S/L Cave & crew failed to return - F/O Wright & crew "walked out" over Blackburn, F/O Charlton & crew were diverted to Aldergrove eventually landing at Ballyhalbert and F/L Allen & crew luckily made it to Thorney Island. In their mission report (F/L Allen & crew) it is noted "Crew reported worst weather of their experience". According to F/L Allen in his memoirs, a member of Teddy Wright's crew, Rocky Livingstone had parachuted into water after they had "walked out". He inflated his persoanl dinghy and started to paddle only to bump against a wall a few minutes later. He thought he had landed in the Irish Sea, only to discover he was in a static water tank in Blackburn! Allen recalls this mission as "pointless", given that they lost two aircraft, 8 experienced airmen and that the Queen Mary was capable of out-running any U-boat doing her 24 knots...

- Off to Ballykelly - Northern Ireland 1943 -

Off to Northern Ireland: In May 1943, they were posted to RAF Aldergrove were they joined 86 Sqn and these two formed the only line of defence against the U-boats in the mid Atlantic at the time, comprising of 15-20 planes (Alwyn Jay, Endurance). They would remain at Aldergrove till Sept, when they were posted to RAF Ballykelly, where they would remain for the rest of the war, although detachments were posted to places such as Iceland, Reykjavik (30/09/43 - 06/11/43), Keflavik (04/08/44- 06/09/44) and Gibraltar (01/05/1943 - 09/1943). In his memoirs, F/L Allen also makes mention of the Mk24 torpedo's, code named "Oscar" being carried by 59 Squadron Liberators in June (1943) when he attacked U-600. Alwyn Jay (Endurance) notes that the first Coastal op to use the Oscar was by B/86 on May 12th 1943 (severely damaging U-457) and on May 14th U-266 was sunk by a Liberator of 86 Sqn, believed at the time to be the first outright U-boat kill for a RAF aircraft. Oscars were regarded as top secret, and crews were advised to not keep the weaponry in open view to be photographed by enemy recon aircraft and if diverted to an alternate airfield, the crew were to mount an all night vigil to guard the plane (which usually consisted of one crew member left out in the cold all night). The Oscar had to enter the water at a specific angle and this was vital to its ultimate success, so they were released with a parachute attached to control the angle of decent. Thus it was only allowed that an Oscar be used against an already submerging U-boat so the parachute would not be detected. Crews who carried them were also required to take on oath prior to a mission, swearing that they would not discuss the weapon outside of the operation rooms and according to HF Tuckwood, they were also issued with pistols (for night lookout). Whilst the Oscar was a successful weapon against the U-boat, it was an acoustic torpedo that homed in on the sound of a U-boats propellers (or the loudest sound in the vicinity), thus they could only be used when there were no Allied ships within range of detection, so their use was somewhat limited on convoy patrol. EE Allen notes in his memoirs, that captains and crews carrying the Oscar were warned that any failure to adhere to the guidelines of usage would result in a Court Martial...

F/L Allen also notes that the 59 Sqn Mk V (full VLR) Liberators had the front and top turrets removed to save weight and also the oxygen systems had been totally removed. This meant that if a crew were forced to fly above 10,000 ft for an extended period of time (due to bad weather, evasive action etc) they risked blackouts and irrational behaviour through lack of oxygen. The lack of front armament was however a major issue for crews, and since the arrival of the Liberator Mk.V's without them (April 1943), there had been continuous complaints by 59 crews and it was decided by those in command that all aircraft would have the front turrets put back on once they had reached there time for routine service overhaul... In June, after an air gunner was seriously wounded during a U-boat attack.. the C/O (W/C Gilchrist) grounded all aircraft until they had their nose turrets re-installed... There were no complaints...

The First Captain/Navigator! On 30/12/1943 - in Liberator BZ712 - D/59 - An ANTI-SHIPPING PATROL was undertaken with the Navigator as the Captain. A side note in the ORB states that this was the first time this had happened on the Squadron. The Navigator/Captain was F/O Short. December 1944 also saw the standard crew size (8) increase (over the coming months) with the introduction of a 2nd Navigator. Two Australians were the first of the new recruits to begin op's, with F/O A. Edgar out on the 18th, with F/L E.E. Brown DFC & crew in Liberator V. FL990 "A". The following day F/S D.G. Howard joined F/L I.C. Henry & crew in Liberator V. FL989 "L" and so the trend continued. It had become apparent that the workload of the single navigator was far too demanding and operational fatigue was rampant. With the addition of a second, the workload could be shared and undertaken in 4 hour shifts. By May, all crews have converted.

...::: Liberator FL985 Mk.V - VLR - M/59 :::...

These images are most likely taken before June-July of 1943 when the 59 VLR fleet still had no nose turrets. These pictures were brought home from the war by Sgt "Ace" Bailey. Sent in by his son, Steve Bailey.

Operation Cork: Protect The Fleet! The roles of the Coastal Command squadrons were threefold, the first being Operation Cork. This comprised continuous day and night air patrols between Southern Ireland, the Cornish Peninsula and Brest Peninsula with the aim of preventing U-boats from breaking into the Channel and coastal waters around the South of England. Secondly, Coastal Command were to assist the Allied navies in protecting convoys against E-Boats and enemy light surface craft. Thirdly, the strike/attack squadrons were to cut enemy coastal supply lines. During these operations, aircraft of Coastal Command flew 2,197 ASW (Anti-submarine Warfare) sorties in the Channel and Western Approaches. 72 submarines were sighted, 40 were attacked. Coastal Command anti-shipping and strike squadrons flew 1,672 reconnaissance and 315 strike sorties. (www.raf.mod.uk)

The next day (7th of June) the aircrews were assembled to be told the invasion had begun. The Group had already started its operational plan to protect the landing fleets - operation CORK. As the enemy had concentrated the bulk of his operational U-boats in the French ports, it was expected the U-boats would put to sea to attack the ships supporting the invasion. To prevent such attacks air patrols were organised to cover the approaches to, and in, the western English Channel. The plan was that a plane would observe with its radar every part of the CORK area, from southern Ireland to the mouth of the Loire, 20,000 square miles, every 30 minutes, day and night for an indefinite period. Thirty minutes was chosen as a U-boat was believed to use, in a crash dive, about as much battery energy as could be charged into the batteries in 30 minutes on the surface. If a U-boat had to crash dive every 30 minutes it would show no net gain from charging its batteries while on the surface between dives. It would arrive in the fighting-zone with its crew exhausted, little compressed air to surface and its batteries flat. (www.combinedops.com)

59 Sqn CORK operations: Endurance (Alwyn Jay) states that although 59 Sqn was the only frontline U-boat hunting unit not trained in the use of the Leigh Light in early June 1944, they still took part in operation CORK. Joe Collins, who was Radar Leader for 59 at the time, notes that between the 6th and 24th of June, 59 Sqn flew 92 sorties. Some in support of cross Channel convoys and others in Cork or other similar patrols. This was an average of one sortie every 3 days for each crew. Collins also took part in 6 Cork missions, in which two U-boats were sighted and one attacked unsuccessfully..